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Abstract
In the development phase of an interlocking system realised as a two-channel system with SW
comparison and feedback, there is necessity to define maximum fault detection-plus-negation times
on the base of known reliability parameters and to support them by an appropriate way of test
diagnostics. Using example of the analysis of a two-channel system with two switching points and
feedback and a two-channel system with three switching points and feedback, in the paper there is
discussed an influence of a choice of the interlocking system structure on maximum fault detection-
plus-negation times. For better understanding, in the paper there are given values of maximum
detection-plus-negation times for faults of considered system elements that are calculated using the
values of fictitious element failure rates.
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1. Introduction
Railway traffic control is attended by a risk of hazard situations caused by failure of
an interlocking system that can lead not only to material but also human damages
and losses. For that reason the interlocking system must be designed in such a way
that even under faulty conditions it performs required functions exactly according
to the pre-defined algorithm, in accordance with safety requirements. Measures
taken to ensure this system behaviour can be applied on the system level or on the
level of functional units and system elements. On the system level a choice of an
appropriate system structure is the main matter. Measures applied on the level of
functional units and elements aim mainly at detection of a fault and negation of
its effects. The maximum detection-plus-negation times for individual faults can
only be calculated on the base of the analysis of fault effects on system safety with
known reliability parameters of system elements and known safety requirements to
the system or its part.
1The paper is elaborated with support of the grant VEGA No 1/5230/98 ‘Theoretical Apparatus
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The analysis of fault effects on system safety can be performed for example
with the use of the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The readers not too familiar with
the FTA can be referred e.g. to the paper (LEE, W. S. et al, 1985). The FTA is
a deductive method of the analysis aimed at the exact identification of causes and
their combinations that can bring about the defined top event. The top event may
represent inception or existence of hazardous conditions or inability of the system
to perform required functions. If the fault tree contains n primary events and ui is
the state indicator of the ith primary event (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), then the relationship
between primary events of the fault tree and the top event can be described by the
logical function:
ψ(u) =
m∐
j=1
R j (u) , (1)
where Rj (u) is a logical function of the jth minimal cut, m is a number of the
minimal cuts and u = (u1, u2, . . . un) is a vector of the primary events. Then the
binary order of the primary event states and the top event state is as follows:
ui = 1, if the primary event has occurred,
ui = 0, if the primary event has not occurred,
(u) = 1, if the top event has occurred,
(u) = 0, if the top event has not occurred.
(2)
On the base of the known logical function (1) a methodology given in the standard
(ENV 50 129, 1998) can be used to calculate detection-plus-negation time for a fault
of the system element. The method is based on the following premises, concerning
the fault effects on system safety:
• No single fault can cause a hazardous state occurrence.
• If simultaneous faults of two mutually independent elements can be hazardous
then the detection-plus-negation time should not exceed the value
t0 = 11000 · s , (3)
where s is the sum of the failure rates of elements or their parts whose simul-
taneous malfunctioning could be hazardous.
• If simultaneous faults of three mutually independent elements can be haz-
ardous and there is no possible hazardous combination of faults of two ele-
ments, then the detection-plus-negation time of a fault of the element should
not exceed the value
t0 = 2
s
. (4)
• If simultaneous faults of four mutually independent elements can be haz-
ardous and there is no possible hazardous combination of faults of three ele-
ments and the sum of the failure rates of considered elements s ≤ 2·10−4 h−1,
then the system need not include any mechanism for detection of these faults.
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Usability of this methodology for the analysis of fault effects on the interlocking
system is discussed e.g. in the works (SZABÓ, G. and TARNAI, G., 1999) and
(RÁSTOCˇNÝ, K., 1998).
The paper refers to the coherence of the system structure and requirements
for test diagnostics, all on the platform of the comparison of two different structures
of the two-channel system with software comparison and feedback. It is a typical
problem that must be solved, e.g. in relation with control of external (peripheral)
elements of interlocking and signalling equipment (signal bulb, point operating
device, etc.).
2. Two-Channel System with Software Comparison and Feedback
The interlocking system with composite fail-safety is involved whose required func-
tion is realised double. Correct and safe operation is conditional on correspondence
of results, mutual independence of processes, in-time detection and negation of a
fault.
Fig. 1. Two-channel system with software comparison and feedback
The heart of the matter of the two-channel system with software comparison
(Fig. 1) can be characterised in the following way:
• Both in the unit A and B there is performed software comparison of output
signal values from the units A and B of the interlocking system (a1 = b2,
a2 = b1).
• In the case of successful comparison operation each unit separately issues the
command a3, b3 to the controlled object RO.
• The state of the controlled object and correct operation of the system are also
checked on the base of evaluating signals a4, b4.
The output part of the system VO (an interface between A, B and the controlled
object RO) can be realised using standard electronic elements, special elements with
inherent fail-safety or with their combinations. Required characteristics of elements
used in the chosen structure of the two-channel system with software comparison
and feedback can result from the safety analysis.
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2.1. System with Two Switching Points and Feedback
The units A and B connect the controlled object RO to the power source. Connect-
ing and disconnecting the controlled object RO to/from the power source (terminals
Z1, Z2) are realised through the switches SA and SB, directly controlled by com-
mands from the units A, B (Fig. 2). The only information given to the units A and
B from current sensors PA and PB is information whether the electric current flows
through the controlled object or not. The individual states of the switches SA and
SB are monitored by an appropriate test procedure.
If the faulty connection of the controlled object RO to the power source (top
event O) at time when it should be disconnected is considered hazardous then the
fault tree describing behaviour of the structure shown in Fig. 2 with faulty conditions
of individual elements (Fig. 3) can be built. In the process of making a tree there
is considered a fact that due to faulty information from the sensor PA(PB) the
unit A(B) can generate faulty command to the switch SA(SB). This fault may be
hazardous if occurring simultaneously with a fault in the latter channel.
Fig. 2. Two-channel system with two switching points and feedback
Following states of the top and primary events according to (2) the logical function
for faulty conditions of the two-channel system with two switching points can be
expressed as:
O = A · B + A · SB + B · SA
+SA · SB + A · P B + B · P A + SA · P B + P A · SB + P A · P B, (5)
where A, B, SA, SB, P A, P B are the primary events of elements (unit A, unit B,
switch SA, switch SB, sensor PA, sensor PB) of the structure under consideration.
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Fig. 3. Fault tree of the two-channel system with two switching points and feedback
On the base of known logical function (5), in accordance with the standard
ENV 50 129, the following facts can be declared:
1. All system elements are safety related.
2. System safety can be based on technique of composite fail-safety provided
that:
• The element A is independent of elements B, SB, PB .
• The element B is independent of elements A, SA, PA.
• The element SA is independent of elements B, SB, PB .
• The element SB is independent of elements A, SA, PA.
• The element PA is independent of elements B, SB, PB .
• The element PB is independent of elements A, SA, PA.
• Under faulty conditions of the element A the system will get to the safe
state within the time
tO A = 11000 · (λA + λB + λS B + λP B) .
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• Under faulty conditions of the element SA the system will get to the safe
state within the time
tOS A = 11000 · (λS A + λB + λS B + λP B) .
• Under faulty conditions of the element PA the system will get to the
safe state within the time
tO P A = 11000 · (λP A + λB + λS B + λP B) .
• Under faulty conditions of the element B the system will get to the safe
state within the time
tO B = 11000 · (λB + λA + λS A + λP A) .
• Under faulty conditions of the element SB the system will get to the
safe state within the time
tOS B = 11000 · (λS B + λA + λS A + λP A) .
• Under faulty conditions of the element PB the system will get to the
safe state within the time
tO P B = 11000 · (λP B + λA + λS A + λP A) .
where λA is the failure rate of the element A, λB is the failure rate of the
element B, λS A is the failure rate of the element SA, λS B is the failure
rate of the element SB, λP A is the failure rate of the element PA and
λP B is the failure rate of the element PB .
From the analysis of the scheme in Fig. 2 it is clear that the fault of the element
leading to the faulty switching the switch SA(SB) on has no direct effect on system
operation. On the other hand, if occurring simultaneously with a fault of other
system element this fault can be hazardous. For that reason the system must have a
mechanism for fault detection. To get probability of faulty switching the switches
on lower or equal to the acceptable value, in the scheme according to Fig. 2 the
switches SA, SB must be checked for:
• Their ability to operate within the time period when the controlled object RO
is connected to the power source.
• Their operation free of faults (especially faults of the ‘switch-on’ type) during
the time period when the controlled object RO is disconnected from the power
source.
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Reliable check of switches is conditional on correct operation of the sensors
PA and PB . Mutual independence of sensors and dynamic mode of their operation
is the premise for trustworthiness of provided information. Testing the sensors is
associated with a change of the provided signal. To show an example of checking
the sensors the test procedure is given in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Test procedure
In Fig. 4 operation of the system according to Fig. 2 is demonstrated during
testing it by time-limited commands issued to switch SA or SB on during the time
when the controlled object RO should be disconnected from the power source and
by time-limited commands issued to switch SA or SB off during the time when
the controlled object RO should be connected to the power source. Given values
of logical levels (expected values) characterise the operation of the output circuit
being free of fault and stable. Other values of logical levels (different from those
given) are evaluated by units A, B and specified as products of faulty output circuit,
possibly with more detailed specification. During one test cycle tC the state of
sensors is changed several times (including the time when no controlled object is
to be connected to the power source) and ability of both switches to switch off
is tested. In the process of testing the sensors the following conditions should be
fulfilled:
tC < t0,
tV < tR < tP R, (6)
tV < tZ < tP Z ,
where
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• tC is the time of test cycle,
• t0 is the maximum detection-plus-negation time of a fault, calculated on the
base of information about failure rates of individual system elements,
• tV is the time necessary for evaluation of the sensor state,
• tR is the time necessary for switching the switch off,
• tZ is the time necessary for switching the switch on,
• tP R is the response time of the controlled object to switching the power off,
• tP Z is the response time of the controlled object to switching the power on.
If for any reason the defined conditions could not be fulfilled during realisation of
the system, possible increase of number of switching points should be considered.
2.2. System with Three Switching Points and Feedback
The units A and B connect the controlled object RO to the power source. Connect-
ing and disconnecting the controlled object RO to/from the power source (terminals
Z1, Z2) are realised through the switches SA, SB and SAB , directly controlled by
commands from the units A, B (Fig. 5). The switch SAB is controlled by the AND
gate H and switches on provided that both of units have issued commands to switch
on. The current sensors PA and PB give information to the units A and B only on
whether the electric current flows through the controlled object or not. Individual
states of the switches SA and SB are monitored by an appropriate test procedure.
Voltage sensors PAA and PB B give information about the state of the switch SAB .
In Fig. 4 operation of the system according to Fig. 2 is demonstrated during
testing it by time-limited commands issued to switch SA or SB on during the time
when the controlled object RO should be disconnected from the power source and
by time-limited commands issued to switch SA or SB off during the time when
the controlled object RO should be connected to the power source. Given values
of logical levels (expected values) characterise the operation of the output circuit
being free of fault and stable. Other values of logical levels (different from those
given) are evaluated by units A, B and specified as products of faulty output circuit,
possibly with more detailed specification. During one test cycle tC the state of
sensors is changed several times (including the time when no controlled object is
to be connected to the power source) and ability of both switches to switch off
is tested. In the process of testing the sensors the following conditions should be
fulfilled:
tC < t0,
tV < tR < tP R, (7)
tV < tZ < tP Z ,
where
• tC is the time of test cycle,
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• t0 is the maximum detection-plus-negation time of a fault, calculated on the
base of information about failure rates of individual system elements,
• tV is the time necessary for evaluation of the sensor state,
• tR is the time necessary for switching the switch off,
• tZ is the time necessary for switching the switch on,
• tP R is the response time of the controlled object to switching the power off,
• tP Z is the response time of the controlled object to switching the power on.
If for any reason the defined conditions could not be fulfilled during realisation of
the system, possible increase of number of switching points should be considered.
2.3. System with Three Switching Points and Feedback
The units A and B connect the controlled object RO to the power source. Connect-
ing and disconnecting the controlled object RO to/from the power source (terminals
Z1, Z2) are realised through the switches SA, SB and SAB , directly controlled by
commands from the units A, B (Fig. 5). The switch SAB is controlled by the AND
gate H and switches on provided that both of units have issued commands to switch
on. The current sensors PA and PB give information to the units A and B only on
whether the electric current flows through the controlled object or not. Individual
states of the switches SA and SB are monitored by an appropriate test procedure.
Voltage sensors PAA and PB B give information about the state of the switch SAB .
If the faulty connection of the controlled object RO to the power source (top
event O) at time when it should be disconnected is considered hazardous then the
fault tree describing behaviour of the structure shown in Fig. 5 with faulty conditions
of individual elements can be built (Fig. 6).
Following states of the top and primary events according to (2) the logical
function for faulty conditions of the two-channel system with three switching points
can be expressed as:
O = A · B + A · SB · H + B · SA · H + A · SB · SAB
+B · SA · SAB + SA · SB · H + A · P B · P B B + B · P A · P AA (8)+SA · H · P B · P B B + SB · H · P A · P AA + SA · SB · SAB
+SA · SAB · P B · P B B + SB · SAB · P A · P AA + P A · P B · P AA · P B B,
where A, B, SA, SB, SAB , H, P A, P B, P AA and P B B are the primary events of the
elements (unit A, unit B, switch SA, switch SB, switch SAB , gate H , sensor PA,
sensor PB , sensor PAA , sensor PB B) of the structure under consideration.
On the base of the known logical function (7), in accordance with the standard
ENV 50 129, the following facts can be declared:
1. All system elements are safety related.
2. System safety can be based on technique of composite fail-safety provided
that:
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Fig. 5. Two-channel system with three switching points and feedback
• The element A is independent of elements B, SB, SAB , H , PB , PB B .
• The element B is independent of elements A, SA, SAB , H , PA, PAA .
• The element H is independent of elements A, B, SA, SB, PA, PAA , PB ,
PB B .
• The element SA is independent of elements B, SB, SAB , H , PB , PB B .
• The element SB is independent of elements A, SA, SAB , H , PA, PAA .
• The element SAB is independent of elements A, B, SA, SB, PA, PAA ,
PB , PB B .
• The element PA is independent of elements B, SB , SAB , H , PB , PB B ,
PAA .
• The element PB is independent of elements A, SA, SAB , H , PA, PAA ,
PB B .
• The element PAA is independent of elements B, SB, SAB , H , PB , PB B ,
PA.
• The element PB B is independent of elements A, SA, SAB , H , PA, PAA ,
PB .
• Under faulty conditions of the element A or B the system will get to
the safe state within the time
tO A = tO B = 11000 · (λA + λB) .
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• Under faulty conditions of the element H the system will get to the safe
state within the time
tO H = 2
λH + λA + λB + λS A + λS B .
• Under faulty conditions of the element SA the system will get to the safe
state within the time
tOS A = 2
λS A + λB + λH + λS AB + λS B .
• Under faulty conditions of the element SAB the system will get to the
safe state within the time
tOS AB = 2
λS AB + λB + λA + λS A + λS B .
• Under faulty conditions of the element PA or PAA the system will get
to the safe state within the time
tO P A = tO P AA = 2
λP AA + λB + λP A .
• Under faulty conditions of the element SB the system will get to the
safe state within the time
tOS B = 2
λS B + λA + λH + λS AB + λS A .
• Under faulty conditions of the element PB or PB B the system will get
to the safe state within the time
tO P B = tO P B B = 2
λP B B + λB + λP B ,
where λA is the failure rate of the element A, λB is the failure rate of
the element B, λH is the failure rate of the element H , λS A is the failure
rate of the element SA, λS B is the failure rate of the element SB, λS AB is
the failure rate of the element SAB , λP A is the failure rate of the element
PA, λP B is the failure rate of the element PB , λP AA is the failure rate of
the element PAA and λP B B is the failure rate of the element PB B .
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Fig. 6. Fault tree of the two-channel system with three switching points and feedback
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3. Conclusions
For better understanding in the Table 1 there are given values of maximum detection-
plus-negation times for element faults of considered systems (Fig. 2, Fig. 5) calcu-
lated on the base of given considerations and the simplifying premise
λA = λB = 5E − 5h−1, λS A = λS B = λS AB = 1E − 5h−1, λH = 1E − 7h−1,
λP A = λP B = λP AA = λP B B = 1E − 6h−1.
Table 1. Maximum detection-plus-negation times for system elements
Maximum detection-plus-negation time of the element t 0 [h]
A, B SA, SB SAB H PA , PB PAA , PB B
System with 2
switching points 9 14 – – 16 –
System with 3
switching points 10 24752 15384 16638 39840 39840
In the development phase of the system it is necessary to define maximum detection-
plus-negation times on the base of known reliability parameters and to design ap-
propriate test diagnostics.
Thanks to a change of the structure better prerequisites for ensuring required
system integrity can be created but integrity is one of the system safety attributes
only. The other attribute of equal importance is availability of the system. The
effect of a change of the structure on availability of the system and its evaluation is
not a subject of this paper.
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